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This week, I wanted to put together some thoughts on the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) gathered from across the web. Actually, this is the only story I've wanted to write about, but I haven't sat down for my #TWIST note in about a month.

In fact, I'm not sure there has been any story worth looking into except hurricane impacts on communities and infrastructure when we're talking about infrastructure and infrastructure resilience. Hurricanes Harvey and Irma are crucial because, if nothing else, they demonstrate to us that community resilience has everything to do with the communities' and local government leaders' capacity to respond in the moment and adapt to future possibilities. While it is important to build infrastructure that can withstand a variety of challenges, there are two things we must consider when planning for resilience. First, infrastructure is almost impossible to adapt after it is built. One can harden existing infrastructure, but infrastructure is almost, by definition, completely un-adaptive. Second, the radically de-centralized way in which infrastructure is owned and built--especially in the United States (and I include buildings in infrastructure, which many researchers do not)--makes it nearly impossible to forecast the types of loads that individual systems will be called on to respond to.

Well, I don't want to go too far into that direction. However, I did want to share some stories about the NFIP because we are going to need to call on this program more frequently and deeply in the future. What are the major issues? Is the program vulnerable? Are folks who rely on the program vulnerable? What kind of losses will it be called on to insure in the future? Hopefully, a few of the articles/resources below can shed some light on the state of the NFIP as we enter into new climate realities.

  • Irma, Harvey, Jose, Katia: The Costliest Year Ever? Bloomberg asks whether Harvey et al will be among the costliest disasters ever. A snapshot from their article demonstrates that, globally, American hurricanes are responsible for five of the top 10 most costly events--in terms of insured losses. Where will this year's hurricane season rank?

    The ten most costly disasters in terms of insured losses (in Billions).
    The 10 most costly global disasters in terms of insured losses (in Billions). Source: https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-costliest-insured-losses/
  • Hurricane Sandy Victims: Here’s What ‘Aid’ Irma and Harvey Homeowners Should Expect. While it is critical to re-authorize NFIP and help to ensure that families receive the aid they need, it is unclear whether NFIP in its current form can deliver that assistance. Writing in Fortune Magazine describing the efforts of a group called Stop FEMA Now to promote awareness about some of the major shortcomings (as they see it) of NFIP, Kirsten Korosec writes:

Stop FEMA Now is a non-profit organization that launched after flood insurance premiums spiked as a result of the Biggert-Waters Act of 2012, inaccurate or incomplete FEMA flood maps, and what it describes as questionable insurance risk and premium calculations by actuaries, according to the group.

  • The NAIC has published a very interesting report that shows that, in the average year, NFIP is self-supporting. While in most years it pays out fewer claims that it receives in premiums, catastrophes are well beyond their capability to pay and NFIP must rely on borrowing. Consider Figure 1 from their report:
    Difference between NFIP premiums and claims per year.
    Difference between NFIP premiums and claims per year. Source: <http://www.naic.org/documents/cipr_study_1704_flood_risk.pdf>

    Do you see what they say in those two paragraphs after the figure?! First, note that NFIP must have its borrowing authority reauthorized by Congress before Sep. 30 (it has been extended to Dec. 8), and that it is already $25 billion in debt. Second, note that the NFIP has not priced its policies at "market rates," making NFIP unable to cover losses from major catastrophes. Even with these artificially low rates, vulnerable parties do not purchase the insurance!

  • Finally, J. Robert Hunter writes in the Hill about the fact that NFIP originally contained long-range planning in the legislation. Nonetheless, communities are not enforcing the land-use provisions contained in the law:

When I ran the NFIP in the 1970s, I saw a far-sighted idea that Congress put into action. Congress brilliantly embedded long-range planning into the program: in exchange for subsidies for flood insurance on then existing homes and businesses, communities would enact and enforce land use measures to steer construction away from high-risk areas and elevate all structures above the 100-year flood level. Only pre-1970s structures would be subsidized.

Clearly, from the snippets I've placed here for you, NFIP is in trouble. This is the story. How much longer can we afford to ignore the state of NFIP as a major tool for supporting community resilience?

Recently, NIST has published a new report titled "Further Development of a Conceptual Framework for Assessing Resilience at the Community Scale." I am happy to say that I was a co-author on this report with Alexis Kwasinski, Joseph Trainor, Cynthia Chen, and Francis Lavelle. It is my pleasure to share with you the abstract below:

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is sponsoring the Community Resilience Assessment Methodology (CRAM) project. The CRAM project team is working in parallel with several other NIST initiatives, including: the Community Resilience Planning Guide for Buildings and Infrastructure Systems (https://www.nist.gov/el/resilience/community-resilience- planning-guides), the Center for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning (http://resilience.colostate.edu/), and the Community Resilience Panel for Buildings and Infrastructure Systems (https://www.crpanel.org/). The objective of the CRAM project is to develop a foundation for assessing resilience at the community scale. For the purposes of this project, community resilience is defined as “the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and to withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions” (PPD-21 2013), and a community is defined as “a place designated by geographical boundaries that functions under the jurisdiction of a governance structure, such as a town, city, or county” (NIST 2015). This report continues the develop the concept of community dimensions and services and expands the concept to the dimensions of sustenance, housing and shelter, relationships, and education.

I have been away from writing on the blog, even my personal opinions on current research topics (OK, that's what almost all of this writing is) due to travel, deadlines, and other obligations.  I do want to take an opportunity to announce that a new paper from the SEED research group co-authored by Dr. Francis and Behailu Bekera has just been accepted for publication in the journal Reliability Engineering and System Safety.  I am very excited about this, because I enjoy reading articles from this journal, and have found this research community engaging and interesting in person, as well as on paper.  I'll write a more "reflective" entry about this sometime later, but if you'd like to take a look at the paper, please find it here.  We will be presenting an earlier version of this work as a thought piece at ESREL 2013.  More on the conference paper closer to the date of the conference in October.

Today, I'm presenting a guest post from Behailu Bekera, a first-year EMSE PhD student working in the SEED Group.  He is studying the relationship between risk-based and resilience-based approaches to systems analysis.

Resilience is defined as the capability of a system with specific characteristics before, during and after a disruption to absorb the disruption, recover to an acceptable level of performance, and sustain that level for an acceptable period of time. Resilience is an emerging approach towards safety. Conventional risk assessment methods are typically used to determine the negative consequences of potential undesired events, understand the nature of and to reduce the level of risk involved. In contrast, the resilience approach emphasizes on anticipation of potential disruptions, giving appropriate attention to perceived danger and establishing response behaviors aimed at either building the capacity to withstand the disruption or recover as quickly as possible after an impact. Anticipation refers to the ability of a system to know what to expect and prepare itself accordingly in order to effectively withstand disruptions. The ability to detect the signals of an imminent disruption is captured by the attentive property of resilience. Once the impact takes place, the system must know how to efficiently respond with the aim of quick rebound.

Safety, as we know it traditionally, is usually considered as something a system or an organization possesses as evidenced by the measurements of failure probability, risk and so on. Concerning the new approach, Hollnagel and Woods argue that safety is something an organization or a system does. Seen from a resilience point of view, safety is a characteristic of how a system performs in the face of disruptions, how it can absorb or dampen the impacts or how it can quickly reinstate itself after suffering perturbation.

Resilience may allow for a more proactive approach for handling risk. It puts the system on a path of continuous performance evaluation to ensure safety at all times. Resilient systems will be flexible enough to accommodate different safety issues in multiple dimensions that may arise and also robust enough to maintain acceptable performance.